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Wage Dynamics Network 
 
This paper contains research conducted within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The WDN is a 
research network consisting of economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks (NCBs) of the EU countries. The WDN aims at studying in depth the features and sources of wage 
and labour cost dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. The specific objectives of the network 
are: i) identifying the sources and features of wage and labour cost dynamics that are most relevant for 
monetary policy and ii) clarifying the relationship between wages, labour costs and prices both at the firm 
and macro-economic level.  
 
 
The refereeing process of this paper has been co-ordinated by a team composed of Gabriel Fagan (ECB, 
Bihan (Banque de France) and Thomas Mathä (Banque centrale du Luxembourg). 
 
form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper 
are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the ESCB. 
The paper is released in order to make the results of WDN research generally available, in preliminary 
The WDN is chaired by Frank Smets (ECB). Giuseppe Bertola (Università di Torino) and Julián Messina 
chairperson), Philip Vermeulen (ECB), Giuseppe Bertola, Julián Messina, Jan Babecký (CNB), Hervé Le 
(World Bank and University of Girona) act as external consultants and Ana Lamo (ECB) as Secretary. 3
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This paper documents the existence and main patterns of inter-industry wage differentials 
across a large number of industries for 8 EU countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain) at two points in time (in general 1995 and 2002) and 
explores possible explanations for these patterns. The analysis uses the European Structure 
of Earnings Survey (SES), an internationally harmonised matched employer-employee 
dataset, to estimate inter-industry wage differentials conditional on a rich set of employee, 
employer and job characteristics. After investigating the possibility that unobservable 
employee characteristics lie behind the conditional wage differentials, a hypothesis which 
cannot be accepted, the paper investigates the role of institutional, industry structure and 
industry performance characteristics in explaining inter-industry wage differentials. The 
results suggest that inter-industry wage differentials are consistent with rent sharing 
mechanisms and that rent sharing is more likely in industries with firm-level collective 
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This paper provides evidence on the existence and causes of inter-industry wage differentials 
by exploiting cross-country, time varying information from eight European Union (EU) 
countries. The eight countries for which we have data (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) represent a large proportion of the EU, and moreover 
operate under very different labour market institutions. Wage differentials are estimated 
using the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), a dataset of matched employer-employee data, 
collected from a large sample of firms in each country. The SES contains rich information on 
the structure and distribution of earnings and characteristics of individual employers and 
employees on a comparable basis across countries, and thus provides a unique opportunity to 
estimate inter-industry wage differentials. 
The paper documents the existence and persistence of both observed and conditional (i.e. for 
similar workers in comparable jobs) inter-industry wage differentials and attempts to answer 
the following three questions. First, is there evidence to support the view that inter-industry 
wage differentials reflect unobserved employee quality? Second, are differences in industry 
rents and structure associated with the estimated conditional inter-industry wage 
differentials? Third, do labour market institutions play a role in explaining differences across 
industries in their ability to capture rents?  
Looking at observed wage differentials across industries at the NACE2 level, i.e. raw 
differentials not controlling for worker, job or firm characteristics, and comparing these 
differentials across countries and over two years, the following four facts stand out. First, as 
already well-documented in the literature, inter-industry raw wage differentials are sizeable. 
In our sample, on average, the standard deviation of the raw differentials across countries 
and over time is around 22%. Second, the ranking of industries in terms of the size of the 
differentials appears to be similar across countries. In general, Extraction and Mining, 
Petroleum,  Nuclear and Chemical industries, the Utilities and the Financial and Insurance 
sectors are amongst the highest paying industries in most countries. The lowest paying 
industries include Clothing, Leather and Textiles. Third, despite the similarity of industry 
rankings across countries, there appears to be some cross-country variation in the extent to 
which wages differ. Dispersion is highest in Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Greece, and lowest in 
Belgium, Germany and Italy. Fourth, differentials appear to persist over time. 
Of course, the observed differentials of the average wage across industries could reflect 
differences in worker and/or job features across industries; an industry employing more 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1182
April 2010
skilled and more productive workers is expected to offer higher wages. Therefore, we control 
for observable productive features of the employees (age, education, gender, tenure, type of 
contract, occupation) and characteristics of the workplace they are employed in (firm size, 
type of economic and financial control of the firm, principal market for the firm’s products, 
level at which bargaining takes place, region the firm is located in). Inter-industry wage 
differences appear to remain significant even after controlling for all these characteristics. 
Nevertheless, as expected, conditional wage differentials tend to be smaller in size than 
observed ones. The standard deviations of conditional wage differentials are also smaller 
than those of the observed differentials. In all countries, however, the ranking of the sectors 
is very similar to that obtained from observed wage differentials. This ranking, as was the 
case with the observed wage premia, is similar across countries and has remained rather 
stable over time. Again, despite these similarities, we observe that differences across 
countries in terms of dispersion of these conditional wage differentials exist. The standard 
deviation of conditional wage premia is relatively higher in Hungary, Spain and Ireland, and 
relatively lower in Belgium and Germany. Between 1995 and 2002, the dispersion of 
conditional differentials decreased in Belgium, Greece, Hungary and Ireland; while it 
increased in Italy, Spain and The Netherlands, and remained more or less stable in Germany. 
Having established that wage differentials across industries are not fully explained by 
workers’, job and firms’ characteristics, we investigate whether unobserved quality of 
workers could be a factor behind these differentials. The argument underlying the 
investigation is that if conditional wage differentials reflect compensation for unobservable 
labour quality one would expect the wage premia to be higher at the top end of the 
distribution. Our results do not lend support to this hypothesis. 
Confronting wage differentials with several measures of industry rents, we show that industry 
rents are positively correlated with industry wage differentials, supporting the view that 
industries share rents with their workers. There is also some evidence that the importance of 
rent sharing differs across industries; the elasticity of the wage differential with respect to 
rents is higher in Extraction and Mining, Utilities and Financial Intermediation. Further, we 
find a negative relationship between competition at the sectoral level and industry wage 
differentials. Finally, our results suggest that rent sharing is more intense, the higher the 
percentage of firms with a firm-level collective agreement in the industry and the higher the 
collective agreement coverage. Although, with the available data, we cannot formally exclude 
other non-competitive explanations for the existence of conditional differentials (e.g. 
efficiency wages), we can conclude from the above that inter-industry wage differentials are 
consistent with rent sharing. 7
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1. Introduction  
The discussion on the causes behind inter-industry wage differentials is still unresolved in the 
literature. One strand of the literature argues that such differentials are sizeable and only 
compatible with non-competitive theories of wage determination such as efficiency wage and 
rent sharing theories (see, for example, Krueger and Summers, 1987; Dickens and Katz, 1987). 
Another strand argues that inter-industry wage differentials are poorly measured and would 
significantly decrease in size if unobserved employer and employee effects were taken into 
account (see, for example, Murphy and Topel, 1987; Abowd, et al., 1999; Carruth et al., 
2004).  
This paper provides additional evidence by exploiting cross-country, time varying information 
from eight European Union (EU) countries. The paper presents work on this topic undertaken 
in the context of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN).
1 More specifically, the paper starts by 
summarising the WDN evidence documenting the existence and persistence of inter-industry 
wage differentials for similar workers in comparable jobs in a large number of industries at 
two points in time (in general 1995 and 2002). The eight countries for which we have data 
(Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) represent a large 
proportion of the EU with different labour market institutions. Wage differentials are 
estimated using the so called Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), a dataset of matched 
employer-employee data, collected from a large sample of firms in each country. The SES 
contains rich information on the structure and distribution of earnings and on the individual 
characteristics of employers and employees on a comparable basis across countries, and thus 
provides a unique dataset to estimate inter-industry wage differentials. In addition, the fact 
that these data are available for two points in time, allows us to investigate the relationship 
between relative wage adjustments and changes in the industry structure and performance, 
in the degree of competition in both product and labour markets and in institutional features. 
The period covered is characterised by rapid technological progress, economic globalization 
of European markets and changes in the environment in which European labour markets 
operate, which could have had an impact on national wage structures. Having established the 
existence of sizeable raw and conditional wage differentials, the paper attempts to answer 
the following three questions. (a) Is there evidence to support the view that inter-industry 
1 The WDN is a ESCB/Eurosystem research network which studies the features and sources of wage and labour 
cost dynamics in EU countries. Recent work in a European context on the issue of inter-industry wage differentials 
was also conducted in the context of the Pay Inequality and Economic Performance project (PIEP) using only the 
1995 SES data (see Marsden, 2005). While even more recently, Magda et al. (2008) look at the issue across a large 
number of countries using, however, only the 2002 SES data. 8
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wage differentials reflect unobserved employee quality? (b) Are differences in industry rents 
and structure associated with the estimated conditional inter-industry wage differentials? (c) 
Do labour market institutions play a role in explaining differences across industries in their 
ability to capture rents?  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a selective overview 
of the related literature. Section 3 briefly describes the data sets used, Section 4 discusses 
the observed (raw) wage differentials in the 8 countries, and Section 5 presents and 
discusses the conditional differentials that emerge after having controlled for individual, job 
and firms’ characteristics. Section 6 investigates the importance of unobserved workers’ 
ability as a potential determinant of inter-industry wage differentials. Section 7 focuses on 
the hypothesis that conditional inter-industry wage differentials reflect rent sharing 
between employers and employees. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
2. Literature review  
The existence of industry wage differentials has been extensively documented in the 
economics literature. One of the earliest pieces of documentation is the evidence provided 
by Slichter (1950). In the late 1980s the interest in the topic was revived in a series of papers 
that focused on the US and investigated various facets of the issue.  For example, Krueger 
and Summers (1987 and 1988), Murphy and Topel (1987) and Gibbons and Katz, (1992) 
looked at the role of unobserved quality in explaining inter-industry wage differentials. The 
influence of institutional factors, the persistence of these differentials over time and the 
similarity of the industry wage structure across countries was addressed in Krueger and 
Summers (1987), while the Dickens and Katz (1987) paper studies the occupational wage 
structure. All of the above studies conclude that industry wage differentials persist over time 
although the explanations provided differ. The aforementioned papers, with the exception 
of that of Murphy and Topel, appear to hold the view that inter-industry wage differentials 
cannot be explained by competitive labour market theories since industry wage differentials 
are observed even for individuals with similar ability, furthermore, these same industries are 
the ones that pay higher wages across countries and over time. Non-competitive 
explanations along the lines of a combination of efficiency wage theories and rent sharing 
seem to fit the facts better. Murphy and Topel (1987), on the other hand, challenge this view 
by applying a different methodology taking into account the fact that the sorting of abilities 
across industries is correlated with job attributes. They conclude that about two-thirds of 
industry wage differentials are due to unmeasured worker characteristics while the 9
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remaining third is ascribed to compensation for the instability of jobs within certain 
industries.  
The results of the ensuing literature would suggest that unobserved labour quality might be 
more important than found in the literature previously, and the similarity of the differentials 
across countries is not as great as claimed until then. One could say that since the late 1980s 
the literature has followed mainly three directions in trying to resolve the controversy 
between competitive and non-competitive explanations of inter-industry wage differentials. 
The first, is based on international comparisons (see, inter alia, the list of studies presented 
in Table 1), the second route focuses on the methodologies applied in measuring the 
magnitude of the differentials and on the various assumptions made about the endogeneity 
or otherwise of occupational and industry choice, while the third direction pertains to the 
exploration of longer panels of individuals (see, inter alia, Carruth et al., 2004). 
 As already mentioned above, the verdict of the earlier literature regarding international 
comparisons was that despite certain differences in the magnitude of the inter-industry 
variation of wages, the rankings of industries remained relatively similar across countries a 
fact that was difficult to reconcile with an institutional factors’ interpretation. Edin and 
Zetterberg (1992) is one of the first papers to question the similarity in the structures; using 
micro data for Sweden, the authors illustrate that the raw and conditional dispersion of 
wages in Sweden is narrower than in the US. They ascribe the difference between their 
findings and those reached in the earlier literature to the use of micro-level data, while 
earlier conclusions on cross-country comparisons were based on aggregate data. Zanchi 
(1995) using data for 5 countries (US, Canada, Australia, Germany and the Netherlands) also 
finds that there is not much similarity in the wage structure across countries. Both the Edin 
and Zetterberg and the Zanchi papers attribute the differences in the wage structure 
between countries to divergence in institutions.  
As for the methodological differences, the 1990s literature on the topic makes use of 
more disaggregated industry information, uses individual level longitudinal data for long 
periods of time, explores the hypothesis that firm (rather than industry) wage policies are 
prevalent, and further examines the wage distribution within industries in order to test for 
evidence of differences in qualities between workers which are difficult to measure. Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) for example are able to separate worker and firm fixed effects 
and conclude that a large portion of wage variation in France is due to unobserved person 10
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fixed effects.
2 Goux and Maurin (1999) also estimate inter-industry wage differentials from a 
panel data set of individuals in France over the period 1990-95 and find that (a) the support 
or otherwise of the unobserved quality hypothesis depends on the level of industry wage 
disaggregation used, (b) the most important factor in determining individuals’ wages is not 
in which industry but in which firm the individual works in. Martins (2004) investigates the 
unobserved quality hypothesis by studying inter-industry wage differences in different 
quantiles of the distribution. The reasoning behind this line of investigation is that if 
unobserved ability is significant in explaining industry wage structure, industry wage 
differentials would be wider at the top quantile of the wage distribution. Using micro-level 
data for Portugal, Martins is unable, however, to find evidence in favour of the unobserved 
quality hypothesis. More recently, Gibbons et al. (2005) develop a model in which wage 
changes and sector mobility are endogenous. Their model is estimated using US longitudinal 
data for a large number of individuals over 17 years. The results suggest that while the 
higher wages paid in certain industries, such as Financial intermediation and Professional 
and Business services could be due to unobserved worker quality, this cannot explain the 
wage differences in Extraction and Mining, Manufacturing and Construction. 
Table 1: Indicative studies on cross-country inter-industry wage differentials 






Micro-level data   Sweden and US for 
1984  
Magnitude of conditional inter-
industry wage differentials significantly 
smaller in Sweden than in the US. 
Correlations of wage structures across 
countries estimated on the basis of 
wage differentials arising from 






14 OECD countries, 
1970-85 
Ranking of industries within each 
country shows little variation over 
time. Size of differentials depends 
positively on productivity growth, 
output growth and capital intensity 
and negatively on the degree of import 
penetration. 










Little similarity of conditional wage 
differentials across countries. 
Importance of demographic, human 
capital and socio-economic 
characteristics in explaining inter-
industry differentials varies across 
countries. Importance of institutional 
factors (e.g. degree of centralization of 
negotiations) in explaining cross-
2 Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) allow for endogenous job mobility (on-the-job search) and search frictions. This 
creates heterogeneous bargaining power among firms and therefore different degrees of rent extraction. In that 
case the unobserved person effect is much smaller and decreases with the observed skill level of employees. 11
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country differences in wage structure. 






Wage structure similar across 
developed and developing world but 
explanations for this might differ 




Micro-level data  Netherlands and the 
US 
Dutch and US wage differentials 
correlate strongly, but the standard 
deviation in The Netherlands is up to 
50% smaller. Tenure profiles are flatter 
in The Netherlands and firm size 
matters less. The difference may be 
partly due to more the degree of 
bargaining centralisation.  
Rycx, Tojerow & 
Valsamis (2008) 
Micro-level data  6 West-European 
and 4 East-European 
countries, 2002 
The ranking of sectors in terms of 
wages, even after controlling for 
characteristics, is quite similar in 
Eastern and Western European 
countries. A negative correlation 
between the dispersion of inter-
industry wage differentials and the 
degree of corporatism across countries 
is found. 
Source: Referenced papers. 
3.  Data  
The present study is based on micro data from the first two waves (generally 1995 and 2002) 
of the Structure of Earnings Surveys (SES) carried out by the national statistical offices of 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The SES is a 
standardized survey conducted in 20 European countries. However, the choice of countries 
used in this paper was driven by data accessibility. From 2002, the survey is conducted every 
4 years although at the moment this work was conducted only two waves were available.
3 
The surveys are carried out on a sample of plants selected by stratified random sampling 
(stratification is done by economic activity, size and for certain countries region) while within 
plants a random sample of employees was chosen.
4 The SES provides individual earnings 
data for employees with detailed human capital and demographic characteristics per worker 
and information on firm (employer) features. The first wave refers to the mid-1990s (1995 
for most countries, 1996 for Hungary and 1999 for Belgium), and the second wave refers to 
the start of the current decade (2002 for most countries except Germany for which it refers 
to 2001). The three main advantages of the data are: (a) the earnings information provided 
is standardised across countries, (b) this information is repeated over time and (c) since the 
3 The most recent wave of the SES (2006) has only become available very recently and for a small number of the 
countries in this analysis. 
4 In Italy and the Netherlands employer information refers to the firm rather than the plant. The same is true for 
Belgium if the firm has several plants within the same municipality. For Hungary the sectoral classification of the 
unit of observation refers to the activity of the firm rather than the plant.  12
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data are collected through the employer, the measurement error usually associated with 
household data is much smaller.  
The samples include, in most countries establishments with at least 10 employees, active 
in industry (including construction) and services.
5 The industries, at the 2-digit NACE rev 1.1. 
level, covered for each country are presented in Table A6, while a list with the description of 
each two-digit industry is given in Table A7. The sample of employees includes both full-time 
and part-time employees, but interim and occasional workers with the exception of 
apprentices are not sampled. The survey provides detailed information on monthly and 
annual earnings. The number of hours worked both normal and overtime, is also recorded. 
Employee characteristics include age, education, gender, citizenship, occupation, type of 
contract (fixed term or indefinite length), management or supervisory position, and length of 
tenure within the firm. Firm characteristics include region, industry, firm total employment, 
type of economic and financial control of the firm (private or public), the principal market for 
the firm’s products, and the level at which wage bargaining takes place. A list and short 
description of the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table A5.  
Four alternative measures of earnings were constructed, wherever possible, with the 
available data: (i) average annual earnings including overtime and regular bonuses but 
excluding irregular bonuses, (ii) average hourly earnings including regular bonuses and 
absences paid at full rate but excluding irregular bonuses, (iii) average hourly earnings 
including overtime, regular and irregular bonuses as well as absences paid at full rate, and 
(iv) total annual earnings before tax including all regular and irregular pay components. Our 
preferred variable is the first since this is the one typically used in similar studies and it was 
possible to construct it for every year and country.
6 For countries belonging to the Euro Area 
(EA) in 2002, monetary variables have been expressed in euros using the irrevocable 
exchange rates at which countries converted their national currencies to the euro. 
The samples analysed for almost all countries contain both men and women aged 
between 16 and 65 years old.
7  In certain countries (Belgium, Greece, and Hungary) the 
sample includes only individuals in the private sector, while for the remaining countries 
public-private sector differences are taken into account by using a dummy in the 
5 This includes in general sections C to K of the economic activity classification scheme NACE rev. 1.1. Table A6 
also presents details regarding sample size and the sectors covered in each country.  
6 The only exception is Hungary, for which this measure cannot be calculated for 1996 and we thus use for both 
waves the second measure instead. This should be a good proxy given that in 2002 the two measures are very 
similar. 
7 In Greece, workers younger than 25 and older than 64 were excluded, to increase the homogeneity of the 
sample in terms of marital status which is a determinant of pay (married individuals receive a benefit equal to 
10% of the basic wage) and is not available as a separate piece of information in 2002.  13
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regressions. The occupational classification used is the single-digit International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which organises occupations in ten main groups. The 
regressions contain occupational dummies for eight groups.
8 
Individuals for which earnings information was either not available or which were 
thought to be outliers on the basis of their earnings information in the sample have been 
excluded. More specifically, workers with earnings falling below the first and above the 99th 
percentile within each sector have been excluded.
9 For each country the analysis is restricted 
to individuals belonging to sectors sampled in both waves.  
 
4.   Observed inter-industry differentials   
In this section we look at observed wage differentials across industries at the NACE2 level.
10 
By this we mean raw differentials not controlling for worker, job or firm characteristics, 
calculated as the deviations of (log) mean sectoral wages from a measure of aggregate wages. 
Figure 1 summarises the main facts by plotting the raw industry differentials across around 40 
2-digit (according to NACE Rev.1 classification) industries in each country in each of the two 
years for which SES data is available.
11 When comparing these differentials across countries 
and over the two years, the following four facts stand out. First, as already well-documented 
in the literature, inter-industry raw wage differentials are sizeable. In our sample, on average, 
the standard deviation of the raw differentials across countries and over time is around 22%. 
Second, the ranking of industries in terms of the size of the differentials appears to be similar 
across countries. In general, Extraction and Mining,  Petroleum, Nuclear and Chemical 
industries, the Utilities and the Financial and Insurance sectors are amongst the highest 
paying industries in most countries. The lowest paying industries include Clothing, Leather 
and Textiles industries. Third, despite the similarity of industry rankings across countries, 
there appears to be some cross-country variation in the extent to which wages differ. 
Appendix table A1 reports in more detail the observed wage differentials for eight EU 
countries in the first year of our sample where wage differences are expressed in 100 
percentage points. Table A2 shows the same information for the second year. 
8 Employees classified as belonging either to the Armed Forces (ISCO group 0) or as ‘Skilled agriculture and fishery 
workers’ (ISCO group 6) have been excluded from the sample. 
9 In Greece the excluded workers are those with monthly earnings less than 80% of the basic minimum monthly 
salary or over 20 times the basic minimum monthly salary.  
10 This level of classification is comparable to the 43 (2-digit SIC) industry groups used in Krueger and Summers 
(1988). 
11 The number of two-digit industries used in the analysis varies from 45 in the Netherlands to 31 in Ireland and 32 
in Greece.  14
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Figure 1: Raw industry wage differentials by two-digit NACE rev.1 industry, SES 
(industry classification code on the horizontal axes) 
























































NL-1995 (SD:0.164) NL-2002 (SD:0.208)
IT-1995 (SD:0.198) IT-2002 (SD:0.168)
IE-1995 (SD:0.309) IE-2002 (SD:0.230)
HU-1996 (SD:0.231) HU-2002 (SD:0.305) BE-1999 (SD:0.175) BE-2002 (SD:0.144)
DE-1995 (SD:0.153) DE-2001 (SD:0.167)
ES-1995 (SD:0.252) ES-2002 (SD:0.301)
GR-1995 (SD:0.202) GR-2002 (SD:0.234)
 
Industries classified as high and low paying respectively are more or less the same across 
countries; Table 2 reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients between observed 
industry wage differentials for all countries in 2002. The correlations range from 0.6226 
between Ireland and Hungary to 0.9278 between Belgium and The Netherlands, and are all 
significant at the 5 p.c. level. While the rank correlation is very high, the data show cross-
country differences in the actual size of the differentials by industry and in the overall extent 
of dispersion (Table 3). The observed wage differential for the Chemical industries varies 
from a mere 0.059 in Italy to 0.274 in Hungary, while the premium in the Financial 
Intermediation industry ranges from 0.582 in Ireland to only 0.04 in Germany (see Tables A1 
and A2 in the Appendix). Similarly, at the lower end of the wage distribution where one finds 
industries that are classified as old in Europe, namely Clothing, Leather and Textiles and 
Retail Trade and Hotels and Restaurants - the negative observed differential for the Clothing 
Industry ranges from -0.127 in The Netherlands to -0.357 in Hungary. In Retail Trade the 
negative premium lies between -0.120 in Italy and -0.360 in The Netherlands. As for the 
overall extent of dispersion this appears (Table 3) to be highest in Ireland, Spain, Hungary 
and Greece and lower in Belgium, Germany and Italy. 15
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Table 2: Spearman rank correlation between observed wage differentials in countries in 
2002 
  BE ES DE
2 GR HU  IE  IT NL 
BE  1          
ES  0.9104*  1        
DE
2  0.8626*  0.8443*  1       
GR  0.8400* 0.7757* 0.6957* 1         
HU  0.8635* 0.9078* 0.7435* 0.7574* 1       
IE  0.7461* 0.7296* 0.6757* 0.7391* 0.6226* 1     
IT  0.7748* 0.7530* 0.6809* 0.7574* 0.7139* 0.7591* 1   
NL  0.9278* 0.8983* 0.7774* 0.7539* 0.8096* 0.7217* 0.7296* 1 
2 Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. * Significant at the 5 p.c. level. 
 
Table 3: Standard deviations of observed wage differentials in 1995 and 2002 
  1995 2002  Change 
BE
1  0.175 0.144 -0.031
DE
2  0.153 0.167 0.014
ES  0.252 0.301 0.049
GR  0.202 0.234 0.032
HU
3  0.231 0.305 0.074
IE  0.309 0.230 -0.079
IT  0.198 0.168 -0.030
NL  0.164 0.208 0.044
1 Belgium: 1999 instead of 1995.
  
2 Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. 
3 Hungary: 1996 instead of 1995 
 
Table 4: Spearman rank correlation of observed wage differentials between 1995 and 2002 
BE
1 DE
2 ES GR  HU
3 IE  IT  NL 
0.935 0.932 0.967 0.822 0.860 0.929 0.855 0.929
1 Belgium: 1999 instead of 1995.
 2  Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. 
3  Hungary: 1996 instead of 1995. All 
correlations are significant at the 1 p.c. level. 
 
Within countries, the ranking of sectors has remained broadly unchanged between 1995 
and 2002. Table 4 shows that Spearman rank correlation coefficients of the industry rankings 
across the two years are highly significant (at the 1% level) and range from 0.822 in Greece 
to 0.967 in Spain. However, the change of the extent of dispersion varies across countries.  
 
5.  What role for observable workforce and job characteristics?  
The observed differentials of the average wage across industries summarised in the previous 
section could reflect differences in worker and or job features across industries; an industry 
employing more skilled and productive workers is expected to offer higher wages. In this 
section we try to control for observable productive features of the employees and 16
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characteristics of the workplace they are employed in. To this effect we follow the literature 
and rely on the estimates from extended Mincer (1974) equations for each year and each 







j i Z Y X w η δ γ β α + + + + = ¦ ¦ ¦ ln   (1) 
where wi represents the wage of individual i, X is a vector of workers’ observable individual 
and job related features (age, education, gender, citizenship, tenure, type of contract, 
management/supervisory position, etc.), Y is the vector of employers’ characteristics (firm 
size, location, type of economic and financial control of the firm, principal market for the 
firm’s products, level at which bargaining takes place, etc.).
12 Finally, Z represents industry 
dummies. The parameters of interest are the ɷh where h=1,…,H, where H+1 is the number of 
NACE 2-digit industries in each country sample, ɷh measures the wage differential, ceteris 
paribus, in industry h relative to the omitted industry (H+1). Following Zanchi (1998) we 
calculate inter-industry wage differentials for all H+1 industries with respect to a weighted 
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== ¦ . With ɷh being the estimated sector coefficient from 







ss f o r h H
N =
== ¦  being the sectoral employment share 
in the observed sample. 
 
The standard errors of the industry wage differentials d in equation (1) can be calculated 
by adjusting those of the original OLS estimate ɷh. For that we transform the original 
variance-covariance matrix following Zanchi (1998): 
(* ) ( ' ) ( () ) ( ' ) ' δδ =− − var-cov K es var-cov K es  
where K is a ((H+1) x H) matrix constructed as the stack of an (HxH) identity matrix and a 
(1xK) row of zeros, e is a ((H+1)x1) vector of ones, s is the vector of employment shares of 
the  H  first industries, and  () δ var-cov is the original variance-covariance matrix of the 
12 Appendix Table A5 lists all conditioning variables.  17
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industry dummy coefficients. The standard errors of d are simply the square roots of the 
diagonal elements of this transformed variance-covariance matrix. 
To transform the differentials from log points to 100 percentage points and also to take 
into account the fact that these are sample and not population parameters we transform 
coefficient estimates according to:  
  ()
2 exp -0.5* -1 d dd σ =   
where d is the industry wage differential in log-points and 
2 0.5* d σ  half the variance of the 
industry wage differential (see Reilly and Zanchi, 2003).  
Appendix Tables A3 and A4 report conditional wage premia for the eight EU countries, 
according to equation (2), using the coefficients on sector dummies estimated by equation 
(1).
13 The first point to note from Tables A3 and A4 is that inter-industry wage differences 
remain significant even after controlling for a comprehensive set of worker, job and firm 
characteristics. A large number of these differentials are significant at the 1% level and all of 
them are significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, as expected, conditional wage 
differentials tend to be smaller in size than observed ones. In fact, the differential explained 
through the characteristics conditioned upon can be substantial; as an example, note that in 
2002 the highly positive observed wage differential for a worker in the Coke, Petroleum 
Production and Nuclear Fuel industry in Greece of 56.3%, and for a worker in the Electricity, 
Gas and Water supply in Ireland of 57.1% are reduced to conditional wage premia of 15.3% 
and 21.0% respectively (see tables A2 and A4). In the low-paying industries, wage penalties 
in 2002 for workers in the Hungarian clothing industry of -35.7% and in the Dutch retail trade 
of -36.0% are reduced to differentials of -16.2% and -12.3% after conditioning.  
The reduction in magnitude of the differentials once the conditioning factors are taken 
into account in general does not alter the ranking of sectors within each country. The 
Spearman correlation coefficients between observed and conditional wage differentials in 
1995 and 2002, reported in Table 5, are all statistically significant different from zero and lie 
between 0.732 in Hungary in 1995 and 0.925 in Ireland in 1995. 
 
                                                
13 Estimates of the conditional inter-industry wage differentials for Spain and Greece have been borrowed from 
Izquierdo and Lamo (2008) and Nicolitsas (2008) respectively; also WDN research papers which follow the same 
methodology and use same data as in this paper. SES estimations for Italy, Ireland and Spain were done at the 
Safe Center in Eurostat and those for Germany via remote access at DEstat (Germany). The data for The 
Netherlands was accessible from Statistics Netherlands through remote access at De Nederlandsche Bank.  18
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  BE DE ES GR HU IE  IT NL 
1995
1  0.799 0.745 0.820 0.881 0.732 0.925 0.860 0.835
2002
2  0.772 0.901 0.854 0.848 0.830 0.827 0.876 0.820
1 Belgium: 1999 instead of 1995. 2002, Hungary: 1996 instead of 1995.
2 Germany: 2001. All correlations are 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Furthermore, the ranking of sectors in terms of conditional wage premia, as was the case 
with the observed wage premia, is very similar across countries. Spearman correlation 
coefficients of the rankings between countries, presented in Table 6, are mostly significant at 
the 5% level. High-wage jobs are still to be found in the Extraction and Oil and Chemical 
industries, as well as in Financial Intermediation. Conditional differentials are mostly 
negative in Clothing and Leather industries and in Retail Trade and Hotels and Restaurants. 
Table 6: Spearman rank correlation between conditional wage differentials in countries in 
2002 
  BE DE
1 ES GR HU IE  IT NL 
BE  1          
DE
1  0.712*  1        
ES  0.924*  0.748*  1       
GR  0.616* 0.414* 0.723* 1         
HU  0.740* 0.616* 0.761* 0.456* 1       
IE  0.540*  0.370 0.405*  0.277 0.320 1     
IT  0.901* 0.511* 0.839* 0.660* 0.655* 0.471* 1   
NL  0.806* 0.526* 0.741* 0.474* 0.711* 0.424* 0.753* 1 
1 Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. * Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Similarly to what was the case for observed wage differentials, the ranking of conditional 
industry wage premia has remained rather stable between 1995 and 2002. Table 7 shows 
highly significant (at the 1% level) rank correlation coefficients between the conditional 
wage differentials in 1995 and 2002 in each country, ranging from 0.735 in Hungary to 0.944 
in Germany. 
  Table 7: Spearman rank correlation between conditional wage premia in 1995 and 2002 
BE
1 DE
2 ES GR  HU
3 IE  IT  NL 
0.772 0.944 0.865 0.788 0.735 0.765 0.738 0.813
1 Belgium: 1999 instead of 1995. 2 Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. 3 Hungary: 1996 instead of 1995. All 
correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Again, despite these similarities, we observe that differences across countries in terms of 
dispersion of these conditional wage differentials exist. The standard deviations of 
conditional wage premia in the selected countries in 1995 and 2002, reported in Table 8, 
Table 5: Spearman rank correlation between observed and conditional wage differentials 19
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are, as expected, smaller than those of the observed wage differentials (Table 3). They are 
relatively high in Hungary, Spain, and Ireland and relatively low in Belgium and Germany. 
Between 1995 and 2002, the dispersion of conditional differentials decreased in Belgium, 
Greece, Hungary and Ireland; while this increased in Italy, Spain and The Netherlands, and 
remained more or less stable in Germany.
14 
 
Table 8: Standard deviations of conditional wage premia in 1995 and 2002 
  1995 2002  Change 
BE
1  0.084 0.072 -0.012
DE
2  0.089 0.090 0.001
ES  0.134 0.171 0.037
GR  0.123 0.104 -0.019
HU
3  0.196 0.156 -0.040
IE  0.166 0.136 -0.030
IT  0.098 0.114 0.016
NL  0.086 0.102 0.016
1 Belgium: 1999 instead of 1995. 
2 Germany: 2001 instead of 2002. 
3 Hungary: 1996 instead of 1995. 
 
An alternative way of presenting this information is Figure 2 which shows box plots of the 
conditional inter-industry wage differentials in each of the eight countries for both SES 
waves, thus providing an overview of the within country distribution of these wage 
differentials. The solid box comprises the observations from the 25th to the 75th decile; the 
horizontal line within the box represents the median, the upper and lower horizontal lines 
indicate the largest and smallest non-outlier observations, and the dots denote outliers. The 
spread is highest for Spain, Hungary and Ireland, and is lowest for Belgium and Germany. 
It is the level of these remaining conditional inter-industry wage differentials that we seek to 
explain in Section 7 after first having had a look at the role of unobserved personal effects in 






                                                
14 Comparing two points in time does not allow one to draw conclusions about trends in the movement of wage 
differentials. Du Caju et al. (2010) show that inter-industry wage differentials decreased in Belgium between 
1999 and 2002 and have risen after that and until 2005, more or less in phase with the economic cycle. 20
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6.  What role for unobservable employee characteristics? 
Having established that for the countries in our sample wage differentials across industries 
are not fully explained by worker, job and firms’ characteristics, i.e. conditional wage 
differentials are still significant and show similar patterns to the observed ones, we now try 
to gather some evidence on whether unobserved quality of workers could be a factor behind 
these differentials. For that we follow Martins (2004) who argues that if conditional wage 
differentials reflect compensation for unobservable labour quality one would expect wage 
premia to be higher at the top end of the distribution. Our results do not lend support to this 
hypothesis. 
We first test, for each industry, whether workers at the 90
th percentile of the wage 
distribution receive on average higher wage premia than those at the 10
th percentile. The 
evidence reveals that while in most countries and industries, the differences between 90th 
and 10th percentile are significant, in most instances the wage differentials are higher at the 
lower end of the distribution (10
th) than at the top end of the distribution (90
th), which goes 
against the unobserved quality hypothesis. Furthermore, Table A8 which summarises this 
information and presents the average difference in the differentials separately for low-wage 
industries and for high-wage industries, shows that in a number of instances the differential 
is not more positive for the highest paying industries. We therefore do not find evidence to 
support the unobservable quality hypothesis as an explanation of industry wage 
differentials.  21
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7.  What role for industry structure, performance and labour market institutions? 
So far we have concluded that in contrast with the predictions of competitive labour market 
models, identical workers performing comparable jobs but working in different industries 
are paid different wages. We next turn to explore the role of industry specific characteristics 
and labour market institutions in explaining the conditional wage differentials across 
industries, with the aim of investigating rent sharing theories.
15 In terms of the equations 
presented in Section 5 the object of interest in this section (the dependent variable) is 
variable  ˆ
k d  from equation 2.  
The estimated specification is the following: 
0
11
ˆ ** kt j t i ikt i jt kt
ii
dQ V γ θ μγ λε
==
=+++ + + ¦¦     (3) 
where  j θ  are country dummies,  t μ  are wave dummies,  ikt Q  are a set of industry-level 
variables (gross operating surplus per employee, share of small firms in the industry) and  jt V  
represent country-level institutional variables capturing for example the extent of collective 
agreement coverage in the industry. 
We first confront the wage differentials with several measures of industry rents. Table 9 
(columns 1-5) shows that industry rents are positively correlated with industry wage 
differentials supporting the view that industries share rents with their workers. Rents are 
proxied here by the average real gross operating surplus per employee in the industry; similar 
results arise, however, with other proxies (e.g. real value added per employee). There is also 
some evidence that the importance of rent sharing differs across industries; interacting the 
rents variable with dummies for eight standard groups of industries, the results (not shown) 
suggest that the elasticity of the wage differential with respect to rents is higher in mining-
refining, utilities and financial intermediation.
16  
Next, we look at measures of product market competition, the understanding being that 
more intense product market competition implies lower rents to be shared. Table 9 shows 
that there is a negative relationship between sector-level competition and industry wage 
differentials (columns 2 and 3). Product market competition is proxied by the share of firms 
with less than 20 employees, the results however are robust to other proxies such as, for 
example, the industry price cost mark-ups estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). 
                                                
15 Support for rent sharing in one of the countries in our sample, namely Belgium, is also well documented in Du Caju 
et al. (forthcoming) who use firm-level rents data and show that wage differentials decrease substantially when 
controlling for firms profits.  
16 The non-homogeneity of this elasticity across sectors is also found by Gibbons et al. (2005). 22
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Table 9: Rent sharing and institutions as explanations of wage differentials 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





*** 0.026* Rents  
Real gross operating surplus per 
worker (GOS)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015)
-0.347***-0.295***   PM competition  
% of small firms in  
the industry   (0.057) (0.076)      
0.030
*   Bargaining structures  
% firms with firm-level collective 
agreement *GOS       (0.016)    
0.062*** Collective agreement  
coverage* GOS       (0.020)   
Observations  526 517 423 229 206 260
R
2  0.18 0.24 0.37 0.51 0.60 0.08 
Notes: 1. OLS regressions weighted by the average sample size of the regression used to calculate the wage 
differentials. Robust s.e. in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include country dummies and 
where appropriate also wave fixed effects. 2. In column (6) GOS is measured as the change between the two waves. 
3. GOS is not available for Ireland; information on the share of small firms per industry is missing for Greece. The 
sample in columns (4) and (5) include only the second wave since the bargaining structures data are only available at 
one point in time.  
 
Delving a little deeper, we also investigate whether differences in the degree of rent 
sharing are related to union clout. To this effect we investigate the role of two variables 
describing bargaining structures: the percentage of firms in the industry with a firm-level 
collective agreement, and the extent of collective agreement coverage in the industry.
17 The 
results (as shown in the interaction terms in columns 4 and 5) suggest that rent sharing is 
more intense, the higher the percentage of firms with a firm-level collective agreement in the 
industry and the higher the collective agreement coverage. Of course, the former result by no 
means establishes a causal relationship since high rent sharing could impact bargaining 
structures. 
                                                
17 The data on the percentage of firms with a collective agreement and collective agreement coverage are drawn 
from the WDN firm-level survey (see Druant et al., 2009 for details), and do not vary over time. Country-level 
information gathered by the WDN (see Du Caju et al., 2008) shows that these variables have remained rather 
stable in the countries under review between the two reference points in time. 23
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Although we cannot with the available data formally exclude other non-competitive 
explanations of the conditional differentials (e.g. efficiency wages), we can conclude from 
the above that inter-industry wage differentials are consistent with rent sharing.  
Finally, in an attempt to find out which factors are associated with wider dispersion of the 
inter-industry wage differential we correlate the standard deviations of the conditional wage 
premia (presented in Table 8) with a number of institutional variables (Product Market 
Regulation, Barriers to Competition, Barriers to Entrepreneurship; Employment Protection 
Legislation, Trade Union Density, Degree of Co-ordination in wage bargaining, Bargaining 
centralization). These correlations, presented in Table 10, are in most instances not 
statistically significant. One which comes out quite significant, however, is the correlation 
between the standard deviation of the conditional wage premia and the degree of 
bargaining co-ordination. in line with the general finding in the literature (see, for example, 
Freeman, 2007) that wage bargaining co-ordination is associated with less wage inequality; 
the higher is the level of co-ordination the lower is the standard deviation of the inter-
industry wage differentials.  
 
Table 10: Correlation coefficients between the dispersion of differentials and a number of 
variables capturing institutional product and labour market characteristics  
 PMR  BTC  BTE  EPL  TUD  CO  CE 
SDCWP 0.13  0.09 -0.35  -0.42
* 0.033  -0.70
*** -0.29 
Notes: Total number of observations used is 16 (8 countries * 2 waves). SDCWP: Standard deviation of the 
conditional wage premia (see Table 8), PMR: Product market regulation index from the OECD PMR Database 
(www.oecd.org/eco/pmr); the higher the value of the index the more regulation exist; BTC and BTE: Barriers to 
Competition and Entrepreneurship respectively from the OECD PMR database (www.oecd.org/eco/pmr); EPL: 
Employment Protection Legislation Index (version 2) from the OECD database (OECD (2004) Table A2.4, p.117 
(the higher the value of the index the more employment protection exists); TUD: trade union density figures from 
OECD Statistics database; CO:  index of bargaining coordination from OECD Statistics database; CE: index of 
bargaining centralization from OECD Statistics database. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels denoted by *, 
** and *** respectively. 
 
 
It must further be noted that despite being small, the changes in wage differentials from 
the first to the second wave in our sample are significantly correlated with the change in 
industries’ rents (see column 6 Table 9).  24
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(i) The ranking of sectors in terms of observed wage differentials, in the EU countries 
we study is persistent over time and similar across countries; 
(ii) A rich set of observable workforce and job characteristics explain less than half of 
the raw inter-industry wage differentials;  
(iii) The ranking of sectors in terms of conditional differentials is similar to that in terms 
of observed wage differentials and exhibits stability over time and great similarity 
across countries;  
(iv) The dispersion of observed and conditional wage differentials differs across 
countries and time. Dispersion is relatively high in Hungary, Spain and Ireland and 
relatively low in Belgium and Germany; 
(v) There is no evidence to support the unobserved quality hypothesis as an explanation 
of these conditional differentials; 
(vi) Confronting the conditional wage differentials with industry-level measures of 
profits and of product market competition, we find that inter-industry wage 
differentials may reflect inter industry variation in rents and industry structure. 
Rent-sharing is enhanced by collective bargaining coverage in general and by firm-
level agreements in particular. 
8. Conclusions 
Using the European SES for eight countries and two points in time this paper shows that 
inter-industry wage differentials are significant and persist over time. Summarizing, we find 
that: 25
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Appendix
Table A1. Observed wage differentials in 1995 
BE
1 ES DE GR  HU
2 IE IT NL 
10 Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of 
peat .  0.567 -0.009 .  0.024  0.276  .  . 
11 Extraction of petroleum and gas  .  0.452 0.372 .  0.371  .  0.179 0.374
13 Mining of metal ores  .  0.266 0.225 .  0.276  1.105  .  . 
14 Other mining and quarrying  0.047 -0.046 -0.133 0.033 0.087  -0.137  -0.111 0.069
15 Food products and beverages  -0.063 -0.041 -0.170 0.080 -0.032  -0.043  -0.014 0.013
16 Tobacco products  0.021 0.270 0.041 0.302 0.798  .  -0.023 0.219
17  Textiles  -0.140 -0.202 -0.191 -0.165 -0.247 -0.139 -0.191 -0.095
18  Clothing  -0.191 -0.356 -0.253 -0.291 -0.307 -0.291 -0.290 -0.130
19  Leather  -0.210 -0.261 -0.251 -0.118 -0.295 -0.261 -0.262 -0.166
20 Wood and cork  -0.156 -0.278 -0.113 -0.126 -0.257  -0.148  -0.226 -0.083
21  Paper  0.041 0.079 -0.040 -0.075 0.080 0.055 0.021 0.093
22 Printing and publishing  0.117 0.078 0.128 0.149 0.000  0.243  0.108 0.056
23 Coke, petrol. prod. and nuclear fuel  0.412 0.877 0.230 0.519 0.537  .  0.237 0.516
24 Chemical and chemical products  0.193 0.213 0.127 0.192 0.274  0.250  0.059 0.222
25 Rubber and plastic products  0.005 -0.065 -0.075 -0.084 -0.022  -0.095  -0.100 -0.008
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  -0.009 0.004 -0.098 0.068 0.018  -0.017  -0.070 0.025
27 Basic metals  0.064 0.227 0.057 -0.001 0.094  0.185  0.059 0.123
28 Fabricated metal products  -0.087 -0.054 -0.023 -0.092 -0.055  -0.078  -0.109 -0.040
29 Machinery and equipment  -0.015 0.083 0.121 -0.028 -0.059  -0.032  -0.055 0.003
30 Office machinery and computers  0.124 .  0.189 .  0.039  0.065  0.254 0.091
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.000 0.015 0.043 0.057 0.077  -0.074  -0.095 0.024
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment  0.130 0.141 0.081 0.014 -0.043 0.025 0.002 0.124
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  0.004 0.078 0.048 -0.171 0.025  0.031  -0.105 0.022
34 Motor vehicles and trailers -trailers  -0.022 0.062 0.173 -0.160 0.136  -0.107  -0.091 -0.027
35 Other transport equipment  0.067 0.162 0.045 0.302 0.222  0.126  -0.018 0.042
36 Furniture, manufacturing  -0.165 -0.207 -0.108 -0.204 -0.232  -0.103  -0.180 -0.213
37  Recycling  -0.166 -0.025 -0.179 .  -0.160 -0.035 -0.214 -0.022
40 Electricity, gas and water supply  0.477 0.516 0.095 .  0.240  0.642  0.418 0.244
41 Collection, purification and distribution 
of water  0.078 0.114 -0.108 . -0.004  .  0.182 0.341
45 Construction  -0.084 -0.092 -0.211 .  -0.147  .  0.007 0.006
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles  -0.020 -0.071 -0.061 -0.049 -0.176  -0.112  -0.129 -0.109
51 Wholesale trade   0.053 -0.109 -0.081 0.036 0.072  0.108  -0.029 0.025
52 Retail trade   -0.158 -0.244 -0.202 -0.233 -0.239  -0.287  -0.123 -0.279
55 Hotels and restaurants  -0.279 -0.217 .  -0.079 -0.246  -0.319  -0.188 -0.125
60 Land transport and pipelines  -0.180 -0.058 .  -0.045 0.018  .  0.239 -0.051
61 Water transport  .  .  .  0.413 -0.004  .  0.231 0.247
62 Air transport  0.119 0.286 .  .  0.548  .  .  0.096
63 Transport activities   -0.020 0.020 .  -0.041 0.002  .  0.001 0.039
64 Post and telecommunications  0.022 0.328 .  0.268 0.119  .  .  -0.030
65 Financial intermediation  0.372 0.451 0.040 0.352 0.433  0.582  0.538 0.166
66 Insurance and pension funding  0.256 0.155 0.164 .  0.283  0.541  0.301 0.223
67 Activities auxiliary to fin. intermed.  0.164 0.284 .  0.293 0.105  .  0.359 0.137
70 Real estate activities  0.000 -0.055 .  .  -0.006  .  0.223 0.174
71 Renting of machinery   -0.020 -0.185 .  .  -0.088  .  -0.236 -0.056
72 Computer and related activities  0.213 0.177 .  .  0.004  .  0.199 0.295
73 Research and development  0.456 .  .  .  0.202  .  0.212 0.356
74 Other businesses activities  0.016 -0.078 .  .  -0.018  .  -0.115 0.007
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Table A2. Observed wage differentials in 2002 
BE ES  DE
1 GR HU  IE  IT  NL 
10 Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of 
peat . 0.759 -0.047 .  0.061  0.106  .  . 
11 Extraction of petroleum and gas  .  0.610 0.385 .  0.297  .  0.364 0.692
13 Mining of metal ores  .  0.416 0.296 .  0.118  0.607  .  . 
14 Other mining and quarrying  0.035 -0.001 -0.047 0.012 -0.009  -0.127  -0.099 0.126
15 Food products and beverages  -0.053 -0.064 -0.236 -0.109 -0.022  -0.003  -0.042 0.150
16 Tobacco products  -0.014 0.195 0.131 0.065 0.705  .  -0.042 0.182
17  Textiles  -0.118 -0.207 -0.218 -0.213 -0.220 -0.243 -0.133 -0.055
18  Clothing  -0.161 -0.344 -0.158 -0.295 -0.357 -0.246 -0.242 -0.127
19  Leather  -0.171 -0.268 -0.199 -0.259 -0.314 -0.158 -0.236 -0.257
20 Wood and cork  -0.135 -0.220 -0.144 -0.152 -0.303  -0.201  -0.253 -0.058
21  Paper  0.053 0.139 -0.043 -0.109 0.126 -0.091 -0.050 0.172
22 Printing and publishing  0.108 0.105 0.168 -0.002 -0.011  0.255  0.072 0.254
23 Coke, petrol. prod. and nuclear fuel  0.335 1.039 0.338 0.563 0.923  .  0.154 0.586
24 Chemical and chemical products  0.180 0.272 0.133 0.093 0.505  0.230  0.134 0.297
25 Rubber and plastic products  -0.013 -0.015 -0.072 -0.162 0.017  -0.106  -0.092 0.026
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.012 0.014 -0.076 0.114 0.084  -0.073  -0.015 0.047
27 Basic metals  0.064 0.287 0.071 -0.031 0.179  0.101  -0.016 0.201
28 Fabricated metal products  -0.052 -0.047 -0.062 -0.195 -0.116  -0.139  -0.077 -0.012
29 Machinery and equipment  0.013 0.080 0.091 -0.139 0.044  -0.064  0.000 0.121
30 Office machinery and computers  -0.030 .  0.210 .  -0.110  0.134  -0.028 0.184
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.012 0.050 0.040 -0.176 0.037  -0.171  -0.075 0.158
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment 0.147 0.102 0.181 0.053 0.080 0.104  -0.025 0.206
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  0.010 0.078 0.069 -0.008 -0.048 -0.009 -0.001 0.059
34 Motor vehicles and trailers -trailers  0.016 0.094 0.155 -0.040 0.329  -0.135  -0.030 0.097
35 Other transport equipment  0.042 0.146 0.161 0.056 0.162  0.157  -0.055 0.161
36 Furniture, manufacturing  -0.147 -0.203 -0.090 -0.245 -0.234  0.085  -0.222 -0.248
37  Recycling  -0.158 -0.186 -0.156 .  0.029 -0.046 -0.177 -0.181
40 Electricity, gas and water supply  0.404 0.711 0.175 .  0.419  0.571  0.222 0.315
41 Collection, purification and distribution 
of water  0.111 0.113 0.052 . -0.077  .  0.145 0.294
45  Construction  -0.056 -0.077 -0.123 . -0.191  . -0.015 0.065
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles  -0.024 -0.076 -0.137 -0.096 -0.229 -0.111 -0.045 -0.121
51 Wholesale trade   0.031 -0.065 -0.021 -0.071 -0.001  0.020  0.023 0.055
52 Retail trade   -0.171 -0.164 -0.200 -0.262 -0.253  -0.228  -0.160 -0.360
55 Hotels and restaurants  -0.261 -0.225 .  -0.204 -0.282  -0.283  -0.208 -0.244
60 Land transport and pipelines  -0.180 -0.025 .  -0.015 -0.013  .  -0.013 -0.007
61 Water transport  .  .  .  0.153 -0.131  .  0.269 0.176
62 Air transport  0.075 0.371 .  .  0.888  .  .  0.121
63 Transport activities   -0.030 0.030 .  -0.063 0.072  .  0.043 0.122
64 Post and telecommunications  -0.018 0.307 .  0.633 0.287  .  .  -0.059
65 Financial intermediation  0.250 0.624 0.100 0.382 0.584  0.272  0.566 0.242
66 Insurance and pension funding  0.271 0.489 0.228 .  0.548  0.436  0.326 0.250
67 Activities auxiliary to fin. intermed.  0.139 0.189 .  0.482 0.401  .  0.042 0.074
70 Real estate activities  0.012 0.009 .  .  -0.007  .  0.015 0.233
71 Renting of machinery   -0.044 -0.173 .  .  0.024  .  -0.044 -0.107
72 Computer and related activities  0.206 0.116 .  .  0.483  .  0.167 0.265
73 Research and development  0.215 .  .  .  0.255  .  0.099 0.357
74 Other businesses activities  0.000 -0.179 .  .  0.015  .  -0.084 -0.096
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Table A3. Conditional wage premia in 1995 
BE
1 ES DE GR  HU
2 IE IT NL 
10 Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of 
peat .  0.522 -0.115 .  0.091  0.058  .  . 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas  .  0.164 0.180 . 0.228  . 0.065 0.236
13 Mining of metal ores  .  0.109 0.214 .  0.561  0.685  .  . 
14 Other mining and quarrying  0.079 0.088 -0.013 0.107 0.224  -0.152  -0.031 0.108
15 Food products and beverages  -0.004 -0.007 -0.083 0.031 0.054  -0.039  0.033 0.058
16 Tobacco products  0.061 0.132 0.085 0.100 0.948  .  0.023 0.167
17  Textiles  -0.043 -0.161 -0.119 -0.062 -0.113 -0.077 -0.097 -0.026
18  Clothing  -0.115 -0.199 -0.141 -0.126 -0.131 -0.076 -0.145 -0.011
19  Leather  -0.079 -0.106 -0.146 0.006 -0.128 -0.113 -0.118 -0.039
20 Wood and cork  -0.050 -0.126 -0.020 -0.062 -0.083  -0.061  -0.113 -0.005
21  Paper  0.069 0.024 -0.005 -0.031 0.111 0.128 0.065 0.094
22 Printing and publishing  0.092 0.039 0.145 0.054 -0.012  0.161  0.074 0.018
23 Coke, petrol. prod. and nuclear fuel  0.205 0.446 0.118 0.156 0.283  .  0.121 0.289
24 Chemical and chemical products  0.102 0.061 0.043 0.059 0.143  0.142  0.014 0.111
25 Rubber and plastic products  0.029 -0.016 -0.033 -0.003 0.011  0.007  -0.039 -0.003
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.032 0.042 -0.037 0.060 0.088  0.005  -0.024 0.027
27 Basic metals  0.055 0.093 0.043 0.002 0.113  0.099  0.038 0.050
28 Fabricated metal products  -0.011 0.013 0.009 -0.057 0.007  -0.015  -0.032 -0.028
29 Machinery and equipment  -0.014 0.025 0.041 -0.066 -0.030  -0.009  -0.039 -0.022
30 Office machinery and computers  0.043 .  0.057 .  0.035  0.020  0.003 -0.012
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.006 -0.009 0.016 -0.003 0.043  -0.012  -0.060 -0.009
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment 0.023 0.006 0.020 -0.089 -0.057  0.029  -0.030 -0.001
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  -0.022 -0.040 0.016 -0.134 -0.044  0.023  -0.056 -0.027
34 Motor vehicles and trailers -trailers  -0.003 0.016 0.103 -0.092 0.061  -0.074  -0.058 -0.040
35 Other transport equipment  0.027 0.052 0.020 0.041 0.047  -0.009  -0.071 -0.005
36 Furniture, manufacturing  -0.089 -0.115 -0.036 -0.101 -0.095  -0.032  -0.098 -0.171
37 Recycling  -0.047 0.074 -0.029 .  0.005  0.125  -0.081 0.006
40 Electricity, gas and water supply  0.319 0.283 0.090 .  0.151  0.316  0.228 0.133
41 Collection, purification and distribution 
of  water  -0.038 0.124 0.109 . 0.018  . 0.121 0.185
45 Construction  0.019 0.032 0.078 .  -0.072  .  0.054 0.030
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles  0.008 0.012 -0.038 -0.045 -0.086  -0.076  -0.018 -0.070
51 Wholesale trade   0.005 -0.061 -0.094 0.036 0.061  0.068  -0.020 0.011
52 Retail trade   -0.064 -0.098 -0.111 -0.100 -0.157  -0.146  -0.041 -0.117
55 Hotels and restaurants  -0.138 -0.011 .  -0.026 -0.144  -0.137  -0.065 0.022
60 Land transport and pipelines  -0.092 0.006 .  -0.016 -0.010  .  0.146 -0.006
61 Water transport  .  .  .  0.406 -0.162  .  0.038 0.126
62 Air transport  0.102 0.120 .  .  0.307  .  .  0.018
63 Transport activities   -0.027 0.012 .  0.002 -0.008  .  0.053 0.041
64 Post and telecommunications  -0.049 0.114 .  0.204 0.029  .  .  -0.043
65 Financial intermediation  0.131 0.095 0.050 0.191 0.237  0.243  0.276 0.090
66 Insurance and pension funding  0.074 -0.028 0.011 .  -0.056  0.213  0.130 0.076
67 Activities auxiliary to fin. intermed.  0.052 0.148 .  0.304 -0.044  .  0.154 0.099
70 Real estate activities  0.015 0.066 .  .  0.065  .  0.215 0.130
71 Renting of machinery   0.007 -0.018 .  .  0.012  .  -0.108 0.017
72 Computer and related activities  -0.028 -0.017 .  .  -0.228  .  0.014 0.074
73 Research and development  0.117 .  .  .  -0.096  .  -0.067 0.083
74 Other businesses activities  -0.014 -0.079 .  .  -0.047  .  -0.057 -0.008
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Table A4. Conditional wage premia in 2002 
BE ES  DE
1 GR HU  IE  IT  NL 
10 Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of 
peat .  0.742 -0.207 .  0.206  -0.057  .  . 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas  .  0.280 0.182 . 0.295  . 0.447 0.387
13 Mining of metal ores  .  0.226 0.172 .  0.047  0.422  .  . 
14 Other mining and quarrying  0.057 0.132 -0.007 0.097 0.158  -0.108  0.032 0.098
15 Food products and beverages  -0.001 -0.048 -0.128 -0.048 0.037  -0.015  -0.004 0.107
16 Tobacco products  0.044 0.040 0.074 0.053 0.600  .  -0.052 0.095
17  Textiles  -0.032 -0.187 -0.121 -0.122 -0.086 -0.147 -0.080 -0.038
18  Clothing  -0.100 -0.196 -0.091 -0.093 -0.162 -0.145 -0.112 -0.057
19  Leather  -0.084 -0.145 -0.111 -0.059 -0.133 -0.130 -0.101 -0.030
20 Wood and cork  -0.051 -0.115 -0.039 -0.081 -0.084  -0.044  -0.135 -0.035
21  Paper  0.067 0.027 0.004 -0.087 0.126 0.081 0.014 0.131
22 Printing and publishing  0.079 0.036 0.133 0.030 -0.056  0.081  0.082 0.120
23 Coke, petrol. prod. and nuclear fuel  0.154 0.521 0.166 0.153 0.378  .  0.135 0.294
24 Chemical and chemical products  0.089 0.101 0.048 -0.006 0.225  0.075  0.053 0.152
25 Rubber and plastic products  -0.002 -0.028 -0.025 -0.068 0.133  -0.027  -0.024 0.016
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.041 0.036 -0.028 0.108 0.128  -0.070  0.012 0.022
27 Basic metals  0.042 0.105 0.053 0.048 0.117  0.079  0.026 0.045
28 Fabricated metal products  0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.065 0.040  -0.052  -0.013 -0.018
29 Machinery and equipment  0.010 0.014 0.033 -0.036 0.074  -0.046  -0.010 0.023
30 Office machinery and computers  -0.084 .  0.048 .  -0.094  -0.017  0.001 -0.039
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus   -0.004 -0.015 0.010 -0.082 0.077  -0.132  -0.038 0.000
32 Radio, television and communication 
equipment 0.039 -0.016 0.057 -0.095 0.070  0.027  -0.011 -0.007
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks  -0.004 -0.024 0.010 0.045 -0.025  -0.071  -0.008 -0.062
34 Motor vehicles and trailers -trailers  0.029 0.018 0.088 -0.029 0.225  -0.107  -0.004 0.025
35 Other transport equipment  0.028 0.034 0.055 0.089 0.027  -0.043  -0.042 0.043
36 Furniture, manufacturing  -0.077 -0.118 -0.042 -0.077 -0.067  0.088  -0.122 -0.134
37  Recycling  -0.019 -0.059 -0.078 .  0.283 -0.105 -0.011 -0.115
40 Electricity, gas and water supply  0.263 0.296 0.105 .  0.221  0.210  0.083 0.173
41 Collection, purification and distribution 
of water  0.100 0.060 0.081 .  -0.018  .  0.122 0.159
45 Construction  0.029 0.068 -0.014 .  -0.069  .  0.034 0.063
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles  0.023 -0.011 -0.063 -0.016 -0.098  -0.034  -0.002 -0.060
51 Wholesale trade   0.002 -0.042 -0.041 -0.005 -0.002  0.069  -0.005 0.005
52 Retail trade   -0.086 -0.065 -0.086 -0.122 -0.116  -0.094  -0.095 -0.123
55 Hotels and restaurants  -0.116 -0.050 .  -0.061 -0.120  -0.174  -0.114 -0.104
60 Land transport and pipelines  -0.099 0.021 .  0.046 -0.047  .  -0.031 0.013
61 Water transport  .  .  .  0.157 -0.196  .  0.214 0.099
62 Air transport  0.033 0.179 .  .  0.206  .  .  0.043
63 Transport activities   0.009 0.005 .  0.040 0.026  .  0.047 0.079
64 Post and telecommunications  -0.072 0.045 .  0.255 -0.036  .  .  -0.014
65 Financial intermediation  0.090 0.203 0.055 0.099 0.295  0.193  0.364 0.093
66 Insurance and pension funding  0.094 0.195 0.035 .  0.057  0.289  0.144 0.070
67 Activities auxiliary to fin. intermed.  0.025 0.085 .  0.281 0.130  .  0.050 0.023
70 Real estate activities  0.023 0.098 .  .  0.007  .  0.019 0.138
71 Renting of machinery   -0.009 -0.030 .  .  0.002  .  0.027 -0.068
72 Computer and related activities  -0.009 -0.079 .  .  0.068  .  0.054 0.004
73 Research and development  -0.024 .  .  .  0.048  .  0.042 0.063
74 Other businesses activities  -0.012 -0.065 .  .  -0.046  .  -0.112 -0.015
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Table A5 
nemonic Label  Definition  Country  details
18
Tenu  Tenure  Years of service with the 
enterprise (rounded downwards 
to full years) 
NL 1995: missing. 
Age  Employee age in years    BE: grouped; EL 2002: grouped. 
PayP  Total gross earnings in pay period  Monthly earnings   
PayY  Total gross annual earnings (incl. all 
regular & irregular pay components) 
Annual earnings  DE 2002: only for employees who 
were on the payroll for the full year; 
AT 2002 also includes payments in 
kind 
PayHb  Basic hourly wage, net of overtime and 
irregular bonuses 
= (payP-payOv)/hoursN   
payH  average hourly earning includes 
overtime, regular bonuses and full rate 
paid absences 
= payP/hoursT  HU 1996: not avaliable 
payHi  average hourly earnings including 
irregular bonuses  
= payH+ Ibonus/hoursY   
payOV  Overtime earnings in pay period     
hoursN  Total (net of overtime) paid hours in 
pay period 
hoursT  Log of hours paid in the ref. period 
includes overtime and absence hours 
paid at full rate 
= hoursN + hoursOv  HU 1996: not avaliable 
hoursOv  overtime hours in pay period    HU 1996: not avaliable 
hoursY  hours worked per year
19  = months*hoursT  HU 1996: not avaliable 
Ibonus  Annual paid irregular bonuses
20    
months  Number of months worked  = (payY- Ibonus)/payP, with a 
maximum of 12 
Exp  Years of potential experience outside 
the company 
age - yedu - 6 -tenu  NL 1995 and HU: exp=age- yedu – 6 
because tenu is missing 
yedu  Years of education  Corresponding to the ISCED-97 
classification
Country specific 
Voc  0,1 dummy  =1 if educ equals an ISCED 
level with vocational training 
Educ Highest  completed level of education 
and training 
ISCED classification   
d_edu  Set of dummies  For each of the ISCED levels 
available
d_nace  Set of dummies  For each of the 2-digit NACE 
classifications available 
d_occone  Set of dummies  For each of the ISCO single-
digit occupations 
d_priv  0,1 dummy  Privately owned enterprise 
(>50% privately owned) 
NL: almost all firms fall outside this 
category and in ‘other’; EL: only 
private sector firms 
d_reg  Set of dummies  Based on the NUTS 1 regions of 
each country 
d_size  Set of dummies  For each of seven size categories 
in number of employees in the 
local unit (or firm). (<=25, 25-
50, 50-150, 150-250, 250-500, 
500-1000, >1000) 
EL: size for 2002 in four groups (10-
19, 20-49, 50-99, >100) 
d_mark*  Set of dummies  For each of the four categories 
of the principle market for 
enterprise’s products (local or 
regional, national, EU, World) 
NL and HU: missing 
d_female  0,1 dummy  =1 if gender is female   
d_indef  0,1 dummy  =1 if contract if of indefinite  HU: missing 32
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Table A6: Sample size and sectors covered by country 
Country Sample size 
1995
Sample size 
2002 Sectors covered 
Belgium (1999 for first 
wave) 101,302 102,941  14,15-37, 40-41,45, 50-55,60,62-
67,70-74 
Germany (2001 for 
first wave)  652,676 467,932  10-11,13-14,15-37,40-41,50-52,65-
66
Greece 20,761  23,863  14,15-29,31-36,50-55,60-61,63-
65,67 
Hungary (1996 for first 
wave) 91,578 119,019  10-11,13-14,15-37,40-41,45,50-
55,60-74 
Ireland 36,727  16,359  10, 15-17, 20-22, 24-26, 28-31, 33, 
35, 36, 50-55, 65-66 
Italy 79,501  73,692  11,14,15-37,40-41,45,50-
55,60,61,63,65-67,70-74 
The Netherlands  66,196  37,860  11,14-37,40-41,45,50-55,60-67,70-
74
Spain 170,697  173,487  10-11,13-14,15-29, 31-37,40-
41,45, 50-55,60,62-67,70-72, 74 
duration 
d_full  0,1 dummy  =1 if full-time employee  EL: only full-time employees used 
since part-time employment is very 
limited.   
d_agr*  0,1 dummy  For each of the types of 
collective agreements (national 
or interconfederal, industry, 
enterprise, single, other) 
NL 1995: industry and enterprise are 
considered as one type; NL 2002: 
missing. 
HU: missing 
d_ctz  0,1 dummy  = 1 if employee is a national 
citizen
NL, IR and HU: missing  
d_man  0,1 dummy  =1 if employee holds 
management or supervisory 
position 33
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C  R10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
C  R11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying
C  R12  Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
C  R13  Mining of metal ores 
C  R14  Other mining and quarrying 
D  R15  Manufacture of food products and beverages 
D  R16  Manufacture of tobacco products 
D  R17  Manufacture of textiles 
D  R18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
D  R19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
D  R20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
D  R21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
D  R22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recordefd media 
D  R23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
D  R24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
D  R25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
D  R26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
D  R27  Manufacture of basic metals 
D  R28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
D  R29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (n.e.c) 
D  R30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
D  R31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
D  R32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
D  R33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
D  R34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
D  R35  Manufacture of other transport equipment 
D  R36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
D R37  Recycling 
E  R40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
E  R41  Collection, purification and distribution of water 
F R45  Construction 
G  R50  Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
G  R51  Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
G  R52  Retail tradef, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods 
H  R55  Hotels and restaurants 
I  R60  Land transport; transport via pipelines 
I R61  Water  transport 
I R62  Air  transport 
I  R63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 
I  R64  Post and telecommunications 
J  R65  Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 
J  R66  Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 
J  R67  Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
K R70  Real  estate  activities 
K  R71  Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
K  R72  Computer and related activities 
K  R73  Research and development 
K  R74  Other business activities 34
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TABLE A8: Average wage differentials gaps between the top and bottom of the distribution 
  Wave 1  Wave 2 












Belgium 0.0023  -0.0374  -0.0035  -0.0692 
Germany 0.0921  0.0967  0.0446  0.0821 
Greece -0.0412  -0.1440  -0.1740  -0.1920 
Hungary -0.1750  -0.1340  -0.0420  -0.1800 
Ireland 0.0021  0.0257  0.0089  -0.1550 
Italy -0.0454  -0.0830  -0.0207  -0.0838 
Netherlands -0.2120 -0.2390  -0.1140  -0.0607 
Spain -0.0176  -0.0961  0.1210  -0.0838 
Note: The average is calculated over the 25% of the highest (lowest) paying industries in each country. 
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